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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATFOFUTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
r

d». \To. 20070614-CA

PATRICK HENR\ v \! DBZ, •
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION \NW M \ II IRF I W IM« )( 'HHDINdS
This is an appeal from consecutive sentences on five third degree felonies: "'-. *'- *
receiving stolen property, attempted burglary, forgery, and two counts of attempted theft by
receiving. This Court

,

<

Kv^JOUbi,

STATEMfcN i » >H THE ISSUE AND S1ANDARD Ox ^ ^ 'IT W
w ;;iv iiiai ^ -a; i «bu>v; its discretion %i imposing five consecutive zero-to-five year
terms when

*" -

,

..jj'j,\j «,; u:w icquired statutory

factors?
No standai aoiic\ iew applies. Defendant made no timely objection to the trial court's
imposition *

• ;.

CONSTIIUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATI IKS., ANI) \<\ II .RS
A ny relevant constitutional provision, statute, or rule is cited in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged in five different informations with two second
degree felonies, four third degree felonies, and seven misdemeanors.
District court case no. 061907518. The first information was filed in June 2006 and
included one felony and four misdemeanors: forgery, a third degree felony; purchase,
transfer, possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a class A
misdemeanor; attempted theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor; theft by receiving stolen
property, a class B misdemeanor, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor. R518:l-3 l
District court case no. 061904724. The second information was filed in July 2006
and included one felony and one misdemeanor: theft by receiving stolen property, a third
degree felony; and theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor. R724:2-3.
District court case no. 061905899. The third information was filed in September
2006 and included one felony and two misdemeanors: burglary, a second degree felony;
theft, a class A misdemeanor; and criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor. R899:2-3.
District court case no. 061906778. The fourth information was filed in October
2006 and included one felony: theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree felony.
R778:l-2.

*To differentiate the five pleadings volumes, the State will include the last three
numbers of the district court case number in its citation, e.g., R[last three numbers of dist.
court, case no.]:[internal record numbers]. Thus, citation to district court case no.
061907516 is indicated by the designation R516: [internal page numbers], and so on.
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.;^o/iet court case nr> ^71901234. The fi fth infdimatioii was filed in November 20uo
•

'

•

.. -

, , u ! ) i , c t i s nig stoicn property, a second degree felony; and

failure to respond to an officer's sip.nnl In \
:

.Plea agreement

n;wH •- .cic:

! :>e three second degree felonies char H I

*_.- •. . 2.
•

-3

attempts ana aeieriucUii UJU caller pled guillv fo flu third degree felonies: forgery, in
violation of t IT \ '(" .

. ., . -,.,„,.

* KOLAI rig stolen property,

in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 7o-o-40b (Wo:? "<*- :

1 e...t .„ I

burglary,, in * 10'lation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7(>-4~102(3), 76-6-202 <West 2004); and two
couir

-. f :n t: -i- _ *

, v;. . .u .-; olen property, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN; § §

76-4-102(3), 76-6-408 (Wc^i 2004 & bur-

"* ^

P'l.SI I >, ' -IS, R724.J. -1,32,

39; R899:2-4, 33,42; R778:1 -2. 34, 41: K234 1 -3. M W; see a£w R43:3-4 (thepresentence
R-po'

. ,. :

.. ... :i\ ^u»pv,j. l'hc remaining seven misdemeanor charges were

dismissed. Id.
Sentence. At the consolidated sentencing hearing, (lie trial
defen-.i.-. -i\

.xtensive criminal history, and the fact that these are all separate criminal

episodes/' R55:5. Thr

jl \ < > 'i IIHTI unposo.1 consecuuve indeterminate prison terms of

zero-to-five years for each of the five third degree felony conv u • 1 < : *-

)ii 1 unpliasi/od

•, • ^

< ' - J< - s- ;'

x v l l 42;R234:90-91.2

2

A copy of the consolidated sentencing hearing trimsc1 i|«i "s aiuclicd JII uic
addendum.
3

Timely notice of appeal. Defendant filed timely notices of appeal. See R518:48;
R724:46; R899:44; R778:43; R234:92.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3
District court case no. 061907518. Defendant and a female cohort attempted to cash
a stolen check at the Check City located at 2490 West 4700 South, in Taylorsville City.
R518:3; R43:5. The check was in the amount of $800 and was written on an account
belonging to Joe Roage. R518:3. Roage reported being burglarized that same morning. Id.
In addition to the stolen checks, the burglar took two Samsonite bags, a television, and CDs
and DVDs. Id. Defendant and his female cohort were later apprehended and found in
possession of Roage's property. R43:5. Defendant's cohort said that he had Roage's
property when she picked him up, and she admitted attempting to cash one of Roage's
checks. R518:4. A search of defendant's person yielded a knife and two syringes. Id.
Defendant admitted carrying a concealed knife and to using narcotics. Id.
District court case no. 061904724. A burglar forced open the front door of Mario
Ramos's home and took several items, including a Jupiter Alto Saxophone valued at
approximately $ 1200. R724:4. Defendant was caught on videotape pawning the saxophone
for $40 at a Cash America located at 4235 West 3500 South. Id. The Cash America

Because defendant pled guilty, the relevant facts are drawn from the Informations,
defendant's statements in support of his guilty pleas, the transcript of the consolidated
sentencing hearing, and the presentence report.
4

employee vended defendant's identity at "the time of the 'transaction and recorded his
fingerprint, . ' 7,-,j- '

District court < ;-'

..

. > JCW ^ihcers responded to a

burglary in progress at 3390 South 685 East R43:6. The officers ^JIW defendant vdu\ ing
a .,. . vision from the home, Id. When defendant realized he had been seen, he dropped the
television and fled <*

-

.uincinciuikcis.

home had been kicked in ^±d the interior ransack,

J

, . i< -*

4. The door of the

c :

;

nephew, was apprehended at the scene, Id. at 7. Defendant and his nephew had been in the
rrocrss iifloiiiJinj' film; slnlen pioperty inki a stolen \ chicle when the police officers arrived.
Id.; see also RZ99:3-4
District court case no. 061906778. Rachel McCalFs car was stolen from where it was
/ ;.

.

i:> residence. R4^:7. A West Valley City police officer

saw defendant park in an alley and bep, in Minim iri^ iIiiiijL?,s from ihe u,n he bad been driving
and throwing them in a nearby dumpster. Id. A records check revealed that the car belt in j:»cd
.. .uu u ai^ car and noted that the engine was running, but that
If ""7.! ' «l V < in n ni ueicndaiu s person revealed "a

there was no key in the igninnn

movie ticket with McCalFs name on it and a filed down ear key." Id. at 3.
,,;; out: L ..A :;<
vehicle in a hieh-sne *

!

>•/ i ..* * Defendant initially eluded police driving a stolen
;

"*' •

R4 V'i

I lie smlui \ e;, . .w was found shortly

thereafter, parkednearthe service entrance of a Sam's Club stun"1: It n:ntv,d af 7571 South 3800
Wi. .,i in ; ail L ,^c County. R234:2. Defendant was spotted in a rear comer of the store
5

"wearing a coat liner" inside out. Id. Realizing he had been seen, defendant headed to the
front of the store. Id. Defendant was stopped and asked for his Sam's Club card, which he
did not have. Id. Defendant first claimed to have entered the store with his mother, but then
said that he had just come through the front doors. Id. at 3. A store employee said defendant
had "approached the front of the store several times to look outside," and acted "extremely
nervous." Id. Defendant appeared to have just shaven and still had red marks on his face,
"missed patches of hair, and hair clippings on his clothes." Id. A pair of black gloves and
a black razor were found in a garbage can in the store restroom. Id. One of the sinks was
also "covered with freshly shaven hair." Id. A sweatshirt was found hidden by some pallets
in the rear of the store where the defendant was first seen. Id.
Defendant denied having a car and said he was planning to ride the bus. Id. But
defendant had a key to the stolen vehicle in his pocket. Id. Defendant did not have the
vehicle owner's permission to drive or use her car. Id.
Consolidated sentencing hearing. At the consolidated sentencing hearing, the trial
court confirmed that defense counsel had "seen the pre-sentence report" before proceeding.
R55:2. Defense counsel thereafter referenced information in the report, emphasizing that he
did not want to "minimize" defendant's "horrible" criminal record, and acknowledging that
defendant had "been essentially in and out of prison, and mostly in prison for the
last—coming up on 40 years." Id. Defense counsel instead wanted to focus on defendant's
attitude, which he characterized as being amenable to treatment: "He's never asked to be out

6

of jail. He told me from the very first time I met him, 'I am a drug addict. I need to be in
jail. I want help. Please get me help.'" Id. at 3; see also id. at 5. Defense counsel
emphasized that defendant had "taken a level ofresponsibility," and had "never complained."
Id. at 3. According to counsel, in defendant's long criminal history, this was the first time
that defendant had admitted to being an addict and that "this [was] something that he [could]
not handle on his own." Id. at 4. Defense counsel argued that defendant had reached the age
in life where he realized "that he doesn't have a whole lot of time left, and . . . he doesn't
really want to spend" that time "in prison." Id. Defendant was also interested in re-engaging
in his son's life. Id. Defense counsel asked the trial court to grant probation and put
defendant in a treatment program, but he also recognized that there was a "strong
presumption that [defendant] will go to prison on these cases; and that [defendant had] come
to terms with that throughout this whole case." Id. at 5. If the trial court imposed prison
terms, defense counsel asked that it follow the recommendation for concurrent terms in the
presentence report. Id. Given the opportunity to address the court himself, defendant
emphasized that he wanted to "get some treatment." Id.
The prosecutor agreed with the recommendation for concurrent prison terms. Id. at
5-6. The prosecutor emphasized that the parole board could ultimately decide "how well
[defendant was] doing in terms of his drug habit and that sort of thing in prison." Id. at 6.
The trial court also heard from one of defendant's victims. Id. at 7. The victim
explained that he felt violated by defendant's criminal conduct, that he worked two jobs to
earn a living, and that, in his opinion, defendant should not be granted probation. Id.
7

Just before the trial court pronounced sentence, defense counsel asked the court to
grant defendant credit for time served, assuming that the trial court was inclined to follow
the recommendation for concurrent prison terms. Id. at 8. The trial court, however, rejected
the recommendation for concurrent terms and imposed consecutive terms, but did grant credit
for time served. Id. at 8-9. In so doing, the trial court expressly noted defendant's "extensive
criminal history, and the fact that these are all separate criminal episodes." Id. Defendant
raised no objection. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Although defendant asked for probation in this case, he acknowledged the strong
possibility of receiving prison terms instead. If the trial court was inclined to deny probation,
defendant asked the court to follow the recommendation for concurrent prison terms, but
made no argument against consecutive prison terms. Moreover, he did not object to the
imposition of consecutive prison terms, and never asserted that the trial court had failed to
consider his character and rehabilitative needs, as he now asserts on appeal. Nor does
defendant assert that this Court should review his claim of sentencing error under the
doctrines of plain error or exceptional circumstances. Thus, defendant's unpreserved
challenge to his consecutive sentences may not be reviewed on appeal.
But even assuming that defendant preserved his challenge to the trial court's
imposition of consecutive terms, he fails to show any abuse of the trial court's broad
sentencing discretion. Contrary to defendant's assertion on appeal, the record reflects that

8

the trial court considered his character and rehabilitative needs before imposing the
consecutive terms.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING
CONSECUTIVE TERMS WHERE THE RECORD REFLECTS THAT THE
TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED ALL REQUIRED STATUTORY FACTORS
Defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of consecutive zero-to-five-year
terms, alleging that the trial court did not adequately consider his "character and
rehabilitative needs." Aplt. Br. at 11. Defendant further asserts that the imposition of
consecutive terms "removed from the Board of Pardons and Parole the opportunity to
monitor [defendant's] rehabilitation and decide his rehabilitative needs if he continued to
show improvement through an appropriate treatment program." Id. at 15. Defendant's
claims should be rejected for at least two reasons.
First, defendant raised no objection below. His challenge is thus unpreserved and he
does not assert plain error or exceptional circumstances. Second, even assuming that
defendant had objected to the consecutive sentences below, he fails to show any abuse of the
trial court's broad sentencing discretion. The record reflects that the trial court considered
his character and rehabilitative needs. Moreover, the consecutive third degree terms had a
floor of zero years. Accordingly, the consecutive terms do not deprive the Board of its
discretion to consider defendant's future progress toward rehabilitation.

9

A.

Defendant preserved no challenge to the trial court's
imposition of consecutive terms, and raises no claim of plain
error or exceptional circumstances*

Utah courts will not consider claims raised "for the first time on appeal unless the trial
court committed plain error or exceptional circumstances exist." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT
4, % 23,128 P.3d 1171 (case citation and quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Cruz,
2005 UT 45, % 33,122 P.3d 543; State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,551 (Utah 1987). Utah's courts require timely and specific objections
"in order 'to bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an
opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate."5 State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah
App. 1993) (citation omitted). See also Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11 ("c [T]he trial court ought
to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it5")
(quoting State v. Eldredge, 11Z P.2d 29,36 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989)).
"Accordingly, an objection cmust at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the
trial [court] can consider it.555 Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 33 (quoting Brown, 856 P.2d at 361).
Here, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to five third degree
felonies—three of which were reduced from second degree felonies—in exchange for
dismissing the seven remaining misdemeanors. See, e.g., R43:3-4. The plea agreement did
not address what recommendation, if any, the prosecutor might give. Id. The presentence
report recommended concurrent prison terms. Id. at 2. At the sentencing hearing, defense
counsel asked for probation, but recognized the likelihood of prison terms and alternatively
asked the trial court to follow the recommendation in the presentence report. R55:5. He
10

made no argument against consecutive terms. Id.; see also id. at 2-4, 6-8. When the trial
court rejected the recommendation for concurrent terms and instead imposed consecutive
terms, emphasizing defendant's "extensive criminal record," and "the fact that these [were]
all separate criminal episodes," defendant raised no objection, and never suggested that the
trial court had failed to consider all legally relevant factors. R55:8.
Notwithstanding the above, defendant asserts that his challenge to the consecutive
terms was preserved when defense counsel asked the trial court to follow the
recommendation in the presentence report for concurrent terms. See Aplt. Br. at 2 (citing
R55:5,43). But defense counsel's request was wholly insufficient to alert the trial court to
the error now claimed on appeal—that it failed to consider defendant's "character and
rehabilitative needs" before it imposed consecutive terms. Aplt. Br. at \\\see also id. at 16.
In other words, defense counsel's request that the trial court follow the sentencing
recommendation did not raise the now alleged sentencing error "'to a level of consciousness
such that the trial [court] [could] consider it.'" Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 33 (quoting Brown, 856
P.2d at 361); State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, \ 17, 122 P.3d 566 (holding Weaver failed to
"distinctly or specifically" articulate claimed error with regard to trial court's ruling on the
inadmissibility of a police report and thus waived the claim on appeal).
This Court's opinion in State v. Williams, 2006 UT App 420,147 P.3d 497, supports
that the consecutive sentencing issue in this case is unpreserved. Although Williams's
challenge to his consecutive terms was sufficiently raised in the trial court, this Court deemed
the preservation issue in Williams to be a close question. Id. at \ 28 n. 6 ("We deem the issue
11

sufficiently preserved, albeit marginally so"). It was a close question because Williams's
defense counsel did not specifically object to the consecutive terms in that case, but did
"assert[] that he had questions about the consecutive nature of Williams's sentences." Id.
Moreover, Williams himself complained that the sentence "was ckind of harsh.'" Id.
Although these broad statements were deemed sufficient to preserve the consecutive
sentencing issue in Williams, no similar statements or objections to the imposition of
consecutive terms are found in this record. See Rl 16:1-5. Thus, unlike Williams, defendant
did not preserve any challenge to the trial court's imposition of consecutive terms.
In sum, because defendant did not object to the legality of the trial court's consecutive
sentences below, see R55:8, and because he does not assert plain error or exceptional
circumstances on appeal, see Aplt. Br. at 6-15, appellate review of the claimed sentencing
error is foreclosed. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 23 n.6 (declining to infer a plain error argument);
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review unpreserved
issue because Pledger did not argue that review was justified by "'exceptional circumstances'
or 'plain error'" (case citation omitted)).
B.

Defendant fails to show any abuse of the trial court's broad
sentencing discretion.

Even assuming that the Court deems the consecutive sentencing issue preserved here,
defendant has shown no abuse of the trial court's broad sentencing discretion.

12

L

Utah trial courts have broad sentencing
discretion.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401(2) (West 2004), requires that when choosing between
consecutive and concurrent sentences, "the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances
of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of
the defendant." A trial court may thus commit error or abuse of its discretion, if it imposes
consecutive terms without considering all the factors that are legally relevant to the
sentencing determination. See, e.g., State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990);
State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996). A trial court, however, need not
explicitly note "the extent to which it considered each of the factors" relating to the specific
factors listed above. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,1fl[ 10-11,40 P.3d 626.
In addition, "as a general rule [the reviewing court] upholds . . . the findings on the
record whenever it would be reasonable to assume the [trial] court actually made such
findings." Id. at ^| 11 (internal quotations and citations omitted). See State v. Valdovinos,
2003 UT App 432,128, 82 P.3d 1167 ("the burden is on the defendant to show that the trial
court did not properly consider all the factors in section 76-3-401(4)"). The presumptive
protection afforded to a trial court's sentence can be rebutted only if "(1) an ambiguity of
facts make the assumption unreasonable, (2) a statute explicitly provides that written findings
must be made, or (3), a prior case states that findings on an issue must be made." Helms,
2002 UT 12, \ 11 (internal citations omitted). None of these circumstances exists here.

13

Moreover, the trial court's discretion in weighing the statutory factors reflects the
general principle that courts are accorded broad discretion in sentencing matters. It is the
trial court, after all, that is in the most advantaged position to make the highly individualistic
assessments required in sentencing decisions. State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah
1997). In deciding the appropriateness of a particular sentence, a trial court must consider
many intangibles, like the defendant's "character, personality, and attitude, of which the cold
record gives little inkling." State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957).
2.

The record supports that the trial court considered defendant *s
character and rehabilitative needs in imposing consecutive
terms; therefore, no abuse of discretion exists.

Here, contrary to defendant's claim, "the record . . . actually contains evidence to
suggest that the trial court did consider all of the factors," including defendant's character
and rehabilitative needs. Helms, 2002 UT12, f 13. Defendant therefore fails to demonstrate
any abuse of the trial court's broad sentencing discretion.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court failed to consider "all of the statutory
factors mandated under Utah law" when it imposed the consecutive sentences below. Aplt.
Br. at 6, 16. See also Section 76-3-401(2). Defendant identifies and analyzes only two of
the required factors in his brief—character and rehabilitative needs. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 11
("[T]he trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences without
adequately considering [defendant's] character and rehabilitative needs"), 15 ("[T]he trial
court in this case failed to consider [defendant's] character or rehabilitative needs"). The
State's analysis thus focuses on these two factors.
14

Notably, defendant acknowledges that "[t]he presentence report... considered all of
the statutory factors," and he does not claim that the trial court failed to review the
presentence report before the consolidated sentencing hearing. Aplt. Br. at 6. Nor could he,
because the record supports that the trial court reviewed the presentence report. Indeed, the
trial court made sure that defense counsel had reviewed the report before the court would
even proceed with the sentencing hearing. See R55:2. Defense counsel affirmed that he had
reviewed the report, and then relied on information in the report in his argument to the trial
court. See, e.g., id.; see also id. at 5. But rather than focus on defendant's "horrible"
criminal history as detailed in the report, defense counsel argued that the trial court should
consider an alleged recent change in defendant's attitude and amenability to treatment:
"[T]hat's what we want the [c]ourt to know, and that's what we want the [c]ourt to focus on,
at least a little bit, rather than just focus on his past." Id. at 4-5; see also id. at 3.
Although defense counsel argued that defendant's allegedly changed attitude rendered
him amenable to treatment, the information in the presentence report undercut that assertion.
For example, defendant told the presentence investigator that, although he had been accepted
into both the Odyssey House and Salvation Army programs, "he would rather complete the
Salvation Army program because he ha[d] heard how tough the Odyssey House program can
be stating, CI don't want to set myself up to fail.'" R43:3. A handwritten note in the margin,
presumably made by the trial court, consequently questioned defendant's amenability to
treatment: "Odyssey House too tough?" Id.
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Defendant's statement in the presentence report indicated his "remorse for each and
every time I find myself in jail or on my way back to prison." R43:7. That remorse,
however, is more directed at his suffering the consequences of his conduct than it is to his
innumerable victims: "I can see that there are many victim's to my crime's [sic] and to the
life styel [sic] of my pass [sic]. I see one more when I look at myself!" R43:8.
Given the above, and defendant's extensive criminal history, dating back to 1966, see
R43:10-15, the presentence investigator reasonably questioned the credibility of defendant's
assertion that he had a changed attitude: "[Although the defendant states he wants the
opportunity for treatment (and has been 'accepted'), what makes 'this time' so different?"
R43:3. Thus, although the investigator "[initially" "had empathy for the defendant and
thought he should be given one chance at probation with treatment," the investigator
ultimately concluded defendant needed to be in prison: "[I]t would be one thing if his crimes
had no victims, but every one of his current offenses has a victim (s). The defendant
repeatedly committed offenses against society and specifically, random innocent individuals
to support his drug habit." Id.
In light of the above, it is not surprising that the trial court emphasized defendant's
"extensive criminal history, and the fact that these are all separate criminal episodes" when
deciding to impose consecutive rather than concurrent terms. R55:8. The trial court's
emphasis on these factors, however, does not suggest that it failed to consider defendant's
character and rehabilitative needs, as defendant now claims. See Aplt. Br. at 11,16. Indeed,
as noted, it is undisputed that defendant's character and rehabilitative needs were folly set
16

out in the presentence report—and that the trial court reviewed the report. See, e.g., Aplt Br.
at 6. Moreover, defendant's asserted change of attitude and amenability to treatment were
the entire focus of defense counsel's oral argument at the consolidated sentencing hearing.
See R55. The record thus supports that the trial court considered defendant's character and
rehabilitative needs, it merely gave them little weight. See section 76-3-401(2).
The real crux of defendant's complaint on appeal appears to be that the trial court
disagreed with his assessment of his character and prospects for rehabilitation. "However,
the fact that [defendant] views his situation differently than did the trial court does not prove
that the trial court neglected to consider" either criteria. Helm, 2002 UT 12, f 14. Defendant
also wants more explanation for the trial court's deviation from the recommendation for
concurrent terms. Aplt. Br. at 13. But the trial court's comments at the sentencing hearing,
emphasizing defendant's "extensive criminal history," and "separate criminal episodes," are
a sufficient basis for departing from that recommendation. Indeed, a trial court need not
explicitly note "the extent to which it considered each of the factors" in section 76-3-401(2).
Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 10. Moreover, nothing in section 76-3-401(2) requires trial courts to
accord each of the statutory factors equal weight, let alone give more weight to a defendant's
newly alleged change of heart over his dismal criminal history and number of victims. See
State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133,1137 (Utah 1989) (no abuse of discretion where trial court
gave more weight to circumstances of offense than to Gibbon's desire to change and postarrest good behavior). See also State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117-119 (Utah 1985)
(recognizing that sentencing judges generally give considerable weight to circumstances of
17

crime); State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) ("One factor in mitigation or
aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale"); State v. Kelly, 784
P.2d 144,145 (Utah 1989) (not abuse of discretion to give little weight to defendant's lack
of similar criminal history, cooperation with law enforcement, or candidacy for a recognized
treatment program).
3.

State v. Smith and State v. Galli are not
controlling.

Because this case involves the imposition of consecutive third degree felony terms,
rather than consecutive first degree felony terms, it is distinguishable from both State v.
Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), and State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998). Defendant
cites these cases to support his assertion that the trial court failed to adequately consider his
rehabilitative needs. Aplt. Br. at 8-9, 15. Smith and Galli stand for the proposition that a
trial court abuses its sentencing discretion when consecutive sentences deprive the Board of
Pardons and Parole of its discretion to consider a defendant's progress toward rehabilitation.
See Smith, 909 P.2d at 245, and Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. Thus, although the Smith and Galli
trial courts considered the requisite criteria, the Utah Supreme Court ultimately overturned
the consecutive sentences in both cases.
For example, in Smith, the supreme court held that consecutive, fifteen-year
minimum-mandatory sentences on four first degree felony offenses—sixty years—amounted
to a defacto life term that effectively deprived the Board of "discretion" to take into account
Smith's "future conduct and possible progress toward rehabilitation." 909 P.2d at 244-45.
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Although the imposition of consecutive sentences on three indeterminate first degree felony
terms in Galli did not involve minimum-mandatory terms, and did not result in an effective
life term, a majority of the supreme court held that the consecutive sentences were sufficient
to deprive the Board of its discretion. Galli, 967 P.2d 938. This is because running the first
degree felony terms consecutively in Galli meant that Galli was ostensibly facing a minimum
of fifteen years to life. Id.
In this case, on the other hand, the five third degree felony terms had a floor of zero
to five years. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203(3) (West 2004). Thus, even running them
consecutively the floor remains at zero years.

Given this circumstance, defendant's

consecutive sentences for five indeterminate third degree felonies are not comparable to the
consecutive first degree felony terms imposed in Smith and Galli. They certainly in no way
impinge on the Board's discretion. Indeed, the Board will exercise its discretion to decide
just how many years, "not to exceed five years," that defendant actually serves on each of
the five terms. § 76-3-203(3). In other words, if defendant shows improvement he may be
released from prison at any time—there is no minimum number of years he must serve. If,
on the other hand, defendant does not progress toward rehabilitation, the Board retains
discretion to keep him incarcerated for up to twenty-five years.
In sum, the record reflects that the trial court considered defendant's character and
rehabilitative needs. And the consecutive sentences do not infringe the Board's discretion
to determine the actual length of defendant's incarceration. Defendant therefore fails to show
any abuse of the trial court's broad sentencing discretion.
19

CONCLUSION
The trial court's imposition of five consecutive zero-to-five year terms should be
affirmed.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on June 22, 2007)

3

THE COURT: Okay.

All right, this is the time and date

4 I set for sentencing in the matters of Patrick Valdez and Donald
5

Valdez.

I understand the same individual; is that right?

6

MR. CORUM: Yes, Judge.

7

THE COURT: You've seen the pre-sentence report?

8

MR. CORUM: We have.

9

THE COURT: All right.

10 I

Please be proceed.

MR. CORUM: Judge, my understanding the Court has

11

received a letter from Mr. Valdez that was forwarded, to my

12

office and to the State on his (inaudible).

Have you reviewed

13 I that, by any chance?
14

THE COURT: It's not in the file.

15

MR. CORUM: I do. May I approach?

16

lot of these things are things he said to —

17

with AP&P and in his statement to AP&P.

18

Do you have it?
I think this — a
in his discussions

I am not going to stand up here and in any way

19

minimize or attempt to minimize what he's done or his record.

20

I mean, quite —

21

and I were just talking about it.

22

prison, you know, almost predates us as people.

23

essentially in and out of prison, and mostly in prison for the

24

last —

25

out for a little while, he re-offends, and then he's —

it's horrible.

coming up on 40 years.

I mean, you know, Ms. Burton
I mean, his first stint in
He's been

You know, he gets out, he stays
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THE COURT: I remember the letter.

2

I don't have a copy.

3

imagining.

I don't know why

It's probably one in the files, I'm

It's not —

there it is. That's right.

4

MR. CORUM: He was sent to prison on his —

5

was 18 on his first adult offense; and he's going back ever

6

since. Quite frankly, I think if people would have looked at

7

it a little bit more closely, could have absolutely predicted

8

this history and this pattern; and it's come to fruition.

9

while he

What I do want to focus on, Judge, is that Mr. Valdez,

10

his attitude throughout this case, since I first met him, he

11

has never —

12

of jail.

13

the very first time I met him, "I am a drug addict.

14

be in jail.

15

not even mentioned the possibility of getting out

He's never asked to be out of jail.

I want help.

He told me from
I need to

Please get me help."

He never talked about trying to beat the cases. We

16

would talk about —

17

couple of these, you know, I had some issues.

18

him about them, and he didn't want to hear any of it.

19

wanted to —

20

his charges on these cases was that it took some time to get

21

them all together.

22

you know, some of the —

quite frankly, a
I would talk to
He just

the only thing that prevented him from pleading

He has taken a level of responsibility that quite

23

frankly I have not seen before, and a level of self awareness

24

about what his problem is and what needs to happen that I

25

think is very, very rare.

He's never complained.

He's never
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(inaudible) delays of this.

2

He's just taken it all in stride and said to me

3

consistently, "That's fine.

4

I need to be clean.

5

help.

6

world.

7

into drugs every single time."

Please get me some help.

I've never had a program.
I get —

8
9

I need to be in jail right now.
I've never had

I get out, you know, into the

things get stressful, and I fall right back

It has, and he's noticed it, and his family's noticed
it.

His long-time friend, Barbara, is here, the mother of his

10

son.

She was relaying to me that this is the first time really

11

this last period that she's ever seen him admit, number one,

12

that he's a drug addict; but number two, that this is something

13

that he cannot handle on his own.

14
15

I don't know what the impetus of it was; whether it
was just he was —

he's gotten to that age where, you know,

16 I he's facing his own mortality, and realizing that he doesn't
17

have a whole lot of time left, and in that time-he doesn't

18

really want to spend in prison.

19

I do know that he connected with his son not too

20

long ago.

21

jail when this first kind of started happening; and they were

22

reconnected, and his son wants him in his life very, very much,

23

and he wants to be in his son's life.

24
25

His son got back from Iraq and visited him at the

So that's what we want the Court to know, and that's
what we want the Court to focus on, at least a little bit,
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1

rather than just focus on his past.

2

chance.

3

treatment a try for once.

That he does have a

He does have the attitude, I think, to at least give

4

THE COURT: Right.

5

MR. CORUM: That's what we're asking for.

We have

6

gone to both Odyssey House and Salvation Army.

7

treatment people feel fairly strongly that Salvation Army is a

8

better option for him, that he will fair better there; but

9

quite frankly, he —

10

Myself and the

we'll take whatever he can get.

Mr. Valdez does understand the strong presumption that

11

he will go to prison on these cases; and he's come to terms

12

with that throughout this whole case.

13

he would ask the Court to follow the recommendation that these

14

be concurrent.

If that were to happen,

15

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

16

Mr. Valdez, this is your opportunity to speak to me

17

about your potential sentencing.

18

would like to say at this time?

19

Is there anything that you

MR. VALDEZ: I don't think I could add any more than

20

what he's said; but I'd just like to confirm that this is how I

21

feel about dealing with it.

I'd like to get some treatment.

22

THE COURT: All right. What's rhe State's position?

23

MR. PLATT: Chad Piatt for the State, Judge.

The State

24

agrees with the recommendation.

Specifically that there's a

25

paragraph that I think is the most noteworthy by the pre-
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sentence preparer on page 3.

2

investigator states that he had empathy, because he's very

3

honest and straightforward with the things that he's done

4

in the past.

5

That is, initially that the

Then concludes, "However he does need to go to prison,

6

based upon the fact that these crimes now are affecting

7

innocent people."

The majority of these crimes involve theft

8 I to support the drug habit; and there's no way that the State
9

can recommend anything else, but to protect our community.

10

The concurrent sentence because of his attitude at

11

this point, that's appropriate.

However, I think he's going

12

to be seeing the parole board and let them decide how well

13

he's doing in terms of his drug habit and that sort of thing

14

in prison,

I'd submit on that.

15

THE COURT: All right.

16

wants to speak to this matter?

Is there anybody here that

17

(No response)

18

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Corum, is there any legal

19

reason of which you are aware not to proceed to sentence?

20

MR. CORUM: No, Judge.

21

THE COURT: Sir, do you want to speak?

22

VICTIM: Your Honor, I was the person that he's — he

23 I is the person that broke into my house.
24
25

THE COURT: Come on up here, and tell me who you are,
sir.

Come right on up and introduce yourself for me.
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2

VICTIM: I apologize coming in dressed inappropriately,
your Honor.

3

THE COURT: You look absolutely fine.

4

VICTIM: I'm sorry about that.

5

broke in —

6

I've been violated.

this person broke in my house.

7

THE COURT: I understand.

8

VICTIM: I'm sorry, violated.

9

I was the person that
I really feel like

I work two jobs.

I work so hard to have my things, and with this guy with no

10

consideration of —

absolutely of nothing.

11

into my house.

12

but that is something that I would rather prefer to have my own

13

things in the beginning before he opened.

14

This the first time it happened?

I had problems.

15

first time it happened.

16

you do this.

17

pain, your Honor.

You know, he broke

My insurance, they pay for it,

I think it's not the

I come here, and there's several times

Why do you do that?

This has caused me a lot of

18

THE COURT; Yes.

19

VICTIM: I really (inaudible) that his sentence that he

20

shouldn't be put on parole.

21

he belongs —

Put him in jail, and this is where

where he belongs to.

22

THE COURT: All right.

23

VICTIM: Thank you, your Honor.

24

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

25

wants to speak in this matter?

Is there anybody else who
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(No response)

2

THE COURT: Mr. Corum, is there any legal reason of

3
4

which you are aware why I should not proceed to sentence?
MR. CORUM: No, Judge.

We would ask the Court, if

5

the Court's going to follow the recommendation, to make a

6

recommendation that he receive credit for time served.

7

THE COURT: All right. With respect to case ending

8

1234, and the charge of attempted theft by receipt of stolen

9

property, a third-degree felony, I'm sentencing you to zero to

10
11

five at the Utah State Prison.
With respect to the matter ending 7518, the charge of

12

forgery, a third-degree felony, I'm sentencing you to zero to

13

five at the Utah State Prison.

14

With respect to the matter ending 724, theft by

15

receipt of stolen property, a third-degree felony, I'm

16

sentencing you to zero to five at the Utah State Prison.

17

With respect to the matter ending 899, attempted

18

burglary, a third-degree felony, I'm sentencing you to zero

19

to five at the State Prison.

20

With respect to the matter ending 778, the charge of

21

attempted theft by receipt of stolen property, a third-degree

22 ] felony, I'm sentencing you to zero to five at the State Prison.
23

These will run consecutively, given your extensive

24

criminal history, and the fact that these are all separate

25

criminal episodes.

You are to serve zero to twenty-five years

-9at the Utah State Prison as a result.

You have 30 days in

which to appeal your sentence.
COURT CLERK: And did you say credit for time served?
THE COURT: Credit for time served.
(Hearing concluded)
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